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COMMENTS
Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity
Problem in Escobedo
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1964 Supreme Court Term, decisions promulgating
new constitutional rules were applied retroactively as a matter of
course to final convictions.1 While dissents occasionally criticized
the Court's failure to discuss the retroactive impact of a new constitutional rule,2 the potential effect upon final convictions of any single
rule was not sufficiently acute to justify a departure from the normal
grant of retroactivity. 8 But the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio;'
which abruptly overturned Wolf v. Colorado 5 and brought into
doubt final state convictions resting upon illegally seized evidence
admitted in reliance upon Wolf, caused courts and commentators
alike to question the necessity for retroactivity in every case. 6 Subsequently, in Linkletter v. Walker, 7 the Court announced a new policy
on the issue of retroactivity and refused to give Mapp retroactive
effect. "Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to
apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively,"
stated the Court, "we must then weigh the merits and demerits in
each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question .•.
and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation.'' 8
In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,9 handed down this Term,
the Court again departed from the normal rule of retroactivity by
deciding that Griffin v. California, 10 which held that adverse comment by a state prosecutor upon a defendant's failure to testify violated the federal privilege against self-incrimination, was entitled to
I. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965).
2. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 406 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963) (per curiam) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (per
curiam) (Harlan&: Whittaker, JJ., dissenting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25•26 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
3. See text following note 65 infra.
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6. E.g., United States ex rrel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381
U.S. 654 (1965); United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963),
afj'd, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 650 (1962); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio
at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319; Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
7. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). ;
,
8. Id. at 629.
9. 86 Sup. Ct. 459 (1966).
10. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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prospective effect only. Because courts are reluctant to disturb final
convictions, the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Linklett~r and
Shott may lead courts to find more generally applicable the considerations underlying the denials of retroactivity for Mapp and Griffin. In
particular, courts may deem these considerations of great, if not dispositive, weight in their resolution of habeas corpus petitions resting
on the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois; 11 in Escobedo, the Court, in a carefully circumscribed holding, assured an
accused person who has not been advised of his absolute privilege to
remain silent the right to consult, upon request, with retained counsel after the "focus [of the police investigation] is on the accused and
its purpose is to elicit a confession."12
Although Linkletter and Shott resulted in denials of retrospective operation, the Court affirmed in both cases that Gideon v. Wainwright,13 which guaranteed an accused the right to counsel at trial
for a serious criminal offense, deserved retroactive operation.14 At
first glance, retroactive effect for Gideon might.seem determinative
for Escobedo because both decisions tum on the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the right to counsel. Hidden· is the facile assumption
that counsel at trial and counsel at the police interrogation perform
similar functions. The precariousness of this assumption has been
disclosed by the authors of a major essay on Escobedo:
At trial, inequality between the State and the individual will
often result in a miscarriage of justice. The innocent defendant
who has no tools for investigation, no.skills for the organization
and presentation of his story or for the cross-examination of his
accusers, and who lacks the knowledge of the relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law, may quickly find himself unjustly convicted.... No such dangers are present during police
interrogation, however. Indeed, the presence of counsel at this
point may very well result in the suppression of truth rather
than its disclosure. This is because counsel, aware of the significance which an accused's admissions may have in building the
prosecution's case, would normally tell his client to remain
silent as a tactical decision. As a result, not only will coerced co~fessions be eliminated, but so will voluntary ones which will
generally contain the truth. The accused's power is increased,
but at the expense of the search for truth.15
11. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
12. Id. at 492.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. 381 U.S. at 639 n.20; 86 Sup. Ct. at 465. Before Linkletter, this conclusion had
been reached by all federal and most state courts. E.g., United States ex rel. Durocher
v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964); In re Palmer, 371
Mich. 656, 124 N.W.2d 773 (1963); see Subilosky v. Commonwealth, 209 N.E.2d 316
(Mass. 1965) (post-Linkletter decision with thorough review· of the authorities).
15. Enker &: Elsen, Counsel for t!ze Suspect: M~iah p. United States and Escobedo
v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L REv. 47, 65-66 (1964).
.
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If the presence of counsel promotes the search for "truth" at trial but
frustrates it at the police station, the argument can then be made that
Gideon and Escobedo, though both sixth amendment cases, effectuate
quite different due process values and that, from the standpoint of
granting or denying retroactivity, they need not be accorded similar
effect. One basic due process objective is to ensure the reliability of
guilt-determination,16 and its vitality would have been seriously
eroded by a nonretroactive holding in Gideon, since Gideon brought
into substantial doubt the reliability of all convictions secured without counsel.17 .A second basic due process objective is to ensure respect for the dignity of the individual.18 If the Court's reasoning in
Linkletter and Shott is accepted, the vitality of this objective is not
impaired by a nonretroactive holding. 10 The argument might be
made that Escobedo, like Mapp, focuses on enhancing the dignity
of the individual by making effective his privilege against selfincrimination. Accordingly, as with Mapp, it would be improper for
the Court to grant Escobedo retroactive effect.
But Escobedo also constitutes a significant aspect of the Supreme
Court's attack on the problems associated with the "coerced" confession cases.20 These cases, which were distinguished in Linkletter and
Shott, have heretofore always been granted retroactive effect.21
Escobedo, in short, is a hybrid, with ingredients of Gideon, Mapp
and Griffin, and the "coerced" confession cases. It is this that makes
the retroactivity issue in Escobedo at once so interesting and so complex. After the two recent Supreme Court decisions denying retroactive application of constitutional rules, Linkletter and Shott, it is
natural to ask whether the considerations that controlled the disposition of the retroactivity issue in Mapp and Griffin or those that controlled in Gideon should govern the resolution of that issue in Escobedo.22
16. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346 (1957).
17. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 639 n.20. See also text accompanying
note 31 infra.
18. Kadish, supra note 16, at 347.
19. "[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored,
Reparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 637. "[I]nsofar as strict
application of the federal privilege against self-incrimination reflects the Constitution's
concern for the essential values represented by 'our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life,"' any impingement upon those values resulting from a State's
application of a variant from the federal standard cannot now be remedied." Tehan v.
United States ex ,rel. Shott, 86 Sup. Ct. at 465.
20. See Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 38-49 (Howard ed. 1965).
21. For example, the Shott and Linkletter opinions both distinguish Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961). See notes 35 8: 37 infra and accompanying text.
22. See HALL &: K.AMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 293 (1965). The retroactivity
issue in Escobedo will be heard by ~e Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 43 N.J. 572,
200 A.2d 737, cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 318 (1965).
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RETROACI'IVITY AFTER LINKLETIER AND SH<?TI

Although in Linkletter the Court enumerated three grounds for
its denial of retroactive effect to Mapp, 23 it primarily stressed that
the purpose of Mapp's exclusionary rule would not be effectuated by
retroactive application.24 That purpose, the Court said, was to deter
illegal police conduct.25 This deterrent purpose could not be served,
the Court believed, by applying the Mapp rule to police misconduct
that had occurred before the rule was announced. 26 Furthermore,
pre-Mapp searches and seizures could not result in convictions of the
innocent, because the illegally seized evidence itself was indisputably
trustw·orthy.27 "[T]here is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion
present in a search-and-seizure case."28
On the one hand, the Linkletter Court distinguished Reck v.
Pate,29 in which the Court in 1961 invalidated a 1936 conviction on
the ground that the confession, though corroborated,30 was involuntary, because a free society will not allow the use of an involuntary
confession, regardless of its trustworthiness. On the other hand,
the Court distinguished Gideon and other retroactive decisions31
23. See text following note 52 infra.
24. 381 U.S. at 636-37.
25. Ibid. The Linkletter dissenters, Justices Black and Douglas, vigorously contested the Court's interpretation of Mapp•s purpose. The dissenters argued that Mapp
prohibits convictions based on unconstitutional evidence, and that a conviction cannot
withstand direct or collateral attack whenever it rests in whole or in part on illegally
obtained evidence. The following passage from Mr. Justice Black's opinion indicates
the dissenters' position: "If .the exclusionary rule has the high place in our constitutional plan of 'ordered liberty,' which this Court in Mapp and other cases has so frequently said that it does have, what possible valid reason can justify keeping people
in jail under convictions by wanton disregard of a constitutional protection which the
Court itself in Mapp treated as being one of the 'constitutional rights of the accused?' "
381 U.S. at 650.
26. Id. at 636-37.
27. Id. at 639. That the Mapp rule did not go to the reliability of guilt determination is a point to which the Linkletter opinion often alluded. Thus the Court referred to Mapp prisoners as "guilty victims," id. at 637, and concluded its analysis
of the potential impact of a retroactive holding by stating, "To thus legitimate such an
extraordinary ,procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt
the administration of justice." Id. at 637-38.
28. Id. at 638.
29. 367 U.S. 433 (1961). The Court also distinguished Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963). As the Court pointed out, Fay, which dealt with the availability of federal
habeas corpus relief, has no direct bearing on the retroactivity issue in Mapp.
30. 367 U.S. at 440.
31. In addition to Gideon, the Court distinguished Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Griffin, the Court said that, although a state is not required to provide appellate review, the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment require that an appeal, if allowed at
all, must be extended equally to all persons. Accordingly, the Court held that states
are obligated to provide free transcripts for indigents who would otherwise appeal.
"Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants
who have money enough to buy transcripts." 351 U.S. at 19. In Linkletter, the Court
said that Griffin was entitled to retroactive effect because "precluding an appeal because of inability to pay was analogized [in Griffin] to denying the poor a fair trial."
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because "the principle that ... [the Court] applied went to the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding process."82
Accordingly, pre-Gideon convictions lacked reliability because innocent defendants, without the aid of counsel, might not have been
able to explain away incriminating evidence offered by the state.83
The distinctions developed in Linkletter are not completely compatible with the reasoning in either Reck or Gideon. In Linkletter,
the Court did not concede that its decision in Reck was retroactive,84
since the principle prohibiting the introduction of involuntary confessions at trial long antedated Reck's 1936 conviction. However, the
Court did not explicitly discuss the fact that Reck's confession was
voluntary by standards prevailing in 1936.85 Indeed, in Reck the
Court relied on decisions that had come down years after Reck's conviction.86 Thus the Court in Reck retroactively applied recently
developed standards of voluntariness to upset a conviction based on
a confession not only voluntary and trustworthy by 1936 standards
but also corroborated and hence unimpeachable in 1961, the year
the Court upset Reck's conviction.87 In Reck, the retroactivity issue
was subtle and, curiously, the Court in Linkletter overlooked it. 88
381 U.S. at 639 n.20: In Jackson, the Court invalidated the New York procedure under
which the jury passed on -the voluntariness of a confession. In Linkletter, the Court
found that the New York procedure affected trial fairness because "the procedural ap•
paratus never assured the defendant a fair determination of [a confession's] voluntariness." Ibid. See generally Note, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REY. 422, 429·33 (1966).
32. 381 U.S. at 639. For a discussion of the effect of Shott upon the Linkletter rclia•
bility standard, see text accompanying note 48 infra.
33. 381 U.S. at 639 n.20. See note 31 supra.
34. 381 U.S. at 638.
35. In Reck, this point was discussed by the district judge and in the brief for the
state of Illinois. The district judge, who denied Reck's habeas corpus petition, made
this finding: "When Reck was convicted in 1936, neither the Supreme Court of the
United States nor society felt that his rights under the Due Process Clause had been
violated. Today, the same circumstances would result in a violation of that Clause."
United States ex rel. Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1959). Nonetheless,
he held (erroneously) that it was within his discretion to deny -the petition. The State
of Illinois argued to the Supreme Court, without avail, that Reck's claim of denial of
due process must be tested by 1936, not 1961, standards. Brief for Respondent, pp. 23•27,
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
36. For example, the Court "color-matched" Reck with Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U.S. 62 (1949), decided thirteen years after Reck's conviction. 367 U.S. at 442. In Linh•
letter, the Court was aware that Reck was released on the basis of standards developed
after his initial conviction. 381 U.S. at 629 n.13.
37. Mr. Justice Clark, who spoke for the Court in Linkletter, dissented in Reck,
and in that dissent he wrote: "[I']he Court bases its reversal on psychological or mental
coercion. In so doing it goes far beyond the •holding of any of the prior cases of this
Court." 367 U.S. at 452. Implicit in these ·words is a recognition that Reck is a retro•
active case. It seems that Mr. Justice Clark did not consider his own appraisal of Reck
when he insisted in Linkletter that Reck was not a retroactive case. Sec also note 86

supra.

38. Compare 381 U.S. at 638 with id. at 629 n.13. But perhaps this oversight is not
so curious. When the overruling decision, like Mapp or Griffin, is an abrupt break with
"well-considered" precedent, the retroactivity issue necessarily arises in stark relief, as
in Linkletter and Shott. By contrast, Reck v. Pate is but one in a series of decisions
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But Reck and Linkletter, considered.together, lead to the incongruous result that in a retroactivity case police misconduct vitiates an unimpeachable conviction obtained in violation of the fifth amendment
but not an unimpeachable conviction obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. Although the Linkletter dissenters criticized the
Court's failure to accord a prisoner the same relief under the fourth
amendment as under the fifth amendment,39 the Court did not choose
to address itself to this issue. The fact that the Court again distinguished Reck in the Shott opinion40 reinforces the belief that retroactivity will be continued in the "coerced" confession cases.41
When the Court in Linkletter distinguished the retroactive holding in Gideon on the basis that the pre-Gideon convictions lacked
"reliability,"42 the Court's hindsight assessment of the purpose of
Gideon was less than adequate. The "fair trial" concept discussed in
Gideon48 is broader, as Professor Currier has remarked, than "intrinsic accuracy in the determination of guilt or innocence" and includes "the integrity of the state criminal law-enforcing institution
[which is] impaired by a failure to observe one of the requirements
of due process."44 Professor Currier further wrote:
The burden of Gideon, then, is essentially that prejudice is immaterial. A prosecuting government might conclusively establish
the absence of any possibility of prejudice, and prove guilt
beyond any shadow of a doubt, yet still the convicted defendant's
fundamental constitutional rights have been violated, and he
which, over the years, have altered legal standards governing the admissibility of confessions. Reck was not viewed as a dramatic departure from precedent, and its retroactive
implications did not merit expression in the opinion in Reck. Similarly, several major
pre-Gideon decisions, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962), Hudson v.
North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960), Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951), arose out of
post-conviction proceedings (as did Gideon) and were thus retroactive decisions. Their
retroactive consequences were not discussed, although Mr. Justice Clark's dissenting
opinion in Hudson did hint at these consequences. "The opinion of -the Court," he
wrote, "bids fair to 'furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide
the prison doors of the land.' Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947)." Hudson and
Chewning eroded the underpinnings of the "special circumstances" rule of Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), by expanding -that concept to cover situations where the
prejudice resulting from the absence of counsel was indeed slight. See Kamisar, Betts
v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH.
L. REv. 219, 278-81 (1962). Thus, where there is a slow erosion of old precedent, as in
the pre-Gideon cases and in the confession cases, retroactive application seems to be
granted as a matter of course.
39. 381 U.S. at 647-48 (Black, J., dissenting).
40. 86 Sup. Ct. at 465.
41. For recent discussions of "coerced" confession cases, including what seems to
comprise a "coerced" confession, see Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions
on Police Interrogation, 25 Omo ST. L.J. 449, 452-58 (1964); Kamisar, supra note 20,
at 38-39.
42. 381 U.S. at 639 n.20.
43. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
44. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA.
L. REv. 201~ 271 (1965).
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must be released and reprosecuted according to the constitutional ritual if punishment is to be imposed.4 G
It is the refusal to appreciate the role "constitutional ritual" played
in Gideon (and in other retroactive decisions) that enabled the Court
in Linkletter to take the narrow position that retroactive effect was
proper in Gideon because Gideon concerned the "reliability" of the
trial.
As a practical matter, the Court's denial of retroactivity in Linkletter shows that the Court will no longer necessarily require adherence to "constitutional ritual" in cases involving retroactivity issues.
Nonetheless, the framing of the Reck and Gideon distinctions underscores the confines of the Linkletter exception to the normal rule of
retroactivity. The Linkletter exception permits a nonretroactive
holding only if the purpose of the new rule is to deter police misconduct and if, under the discarded rule, there was "no likelihood of
unreliability [in the trial] or [police] coercion."46
The decision in Shott broadens the Linkletter exception in one
major respect: the purpose of the new rule need not be only to combat police illegality in order for the rule to be granted solely prospective effect. The Court felt that the purpose of the Griffin rule was
"to be found in the whole complex of values that the privilege
against self-incrimination itself represents." 47 Just as the Mapp rule
could not deter illegal acts committed by the police prior to the
Mapp decision, the Griffin rule could not remedy impingements
upon the values of the fifth amendment privilege prior to the Griffin decision. But again the Court in Shott stressed that the Griffin
rule was divorced from issues relating to the "reliability" of the trial:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not
an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth."48
The Court's treatment of Griffin in the Shott decision, however,
does not squarely come to grips with Griffin's analysis of the effect
of the comment rule upon the trial. In Griffin, Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, said: "What the jury may infer, given no help
from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite
45. Id. at 270. (Emphasis added.) See also note 112 infra. Without defense counsel's
presence, however, the prosecutor cannot demonstrate the "absence of any possibility
of prejudice." At the post-conviction hearing, the trial record will not contain facts
that the researches of counsel might have uncovered, nor will the trial record reveal
the defenses that an imaginative lawyer might have made, regardless of any merit they
might have. See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962); Palmer v. Ashe,
342 U.S. 134, 137 (1951). See also Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Righ(" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L.
REv. I, 42-67 (1962).
46. 381 U.S. at 638.
47. 86 Sup. Ct. at 464.
48. Id. at 465.
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another." 49 The prohibition of comment by the prosecution, he
stressed, is a concession to the frailty of those who suffer from "excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character."50 Such individuals,
though they may be innocent of the charge, are incapable of an effective presentation on the stand; their taking the stand may heighten
the prejudice against them. In Griffin, therefore, the comment rule
was condemned largely because it did aI;J:ect the reliability of the trial.
Nevertheless, the decision in Shott, by emphasizing fifth amendment
values and not discussing reliability factors, indicates that a new rule
will still be entitled to retroactive effect provided that it can be
shown to influence substantially the "ascertainment of truth" or, in
the Linkletter language, the "reliability" of the trial. 51
Two related, supplemental factors in Linkletter and Shott also
influenced the Court to deny retroactive effect to Mapp and Griffin.
First, the Court was unwilling to ignore reliance by the states on
Wolf, in the case of Mapp and Linkletter,52 and on Twining v. New
]ersey, 58 in the case of Griffin and Shott. 54 During the eleven years
that the Court refused to reconsider Wolf and the fifty-seven years it
refused to reconsider Twining, 55 state tribunals had rendered an unknown number of decisions in reliance upon those cases. The Court
concluded in both instances that the decisional history was "an operative fact" which could not "justly be ignored." 56
Second, in Linkletter and Shott the Court was impressed by t4e
burden that a retroactive application of Mapp or Griffin would
place on state court dockets. Specifically, the Court cited the difficulty
inherent in retrials, especially when a long period has elapsed be49. 380 U.S. at 614.
50. Id. at 613 (quoting from Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)).
51. See also text accompanying note 72 infra.
52. "The thousands of cases that were finally decided on Wolf cannot be obliterated." 381 U.S. at 636.
53. 211 u . s. 78 (1908).
54. This point was forcefully stated in Shott: "(T]his reliance was not only invited
over a much longer period of time, during which the Twining doctrine was repeatedly
reaffirmed in this Court, but was of unquestioned legitimacy as compared to the
reliance of the States upon the doctrine of Wolf •.. considered in Linkletter as an important factor militating against the retroactive application of Mapp. During the 11year period between Wolf v. People of State of Colorado and Mapp v. Ohio, the States
were aware that illegal seizure of evidence by state officers violated the Federal Constitution. In the 56 years that elapsed from Twining to Malloy (v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
(1964)], by contrast, the States were repeatedly told that comment upon the failure of
an accused to testify in a state criminal trial in no way violated the Federal Constitution." 86 Sup. Ct. at 466. For an intriguing commentary on the aptness of states' reliance on constitutional decisions, see Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 73-74 (1965). See also
State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 589, 206 A.2d 737, 746, cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 318
(1965).
55. See note 54 supra.
56. 381 U.S. at 636; 86 Sup. Ct. at 463. The language is that of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
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tween the initial conviction and the retrial: "To require all of those
States [the states which had permitted prosecution comment] now to
void the conviction of every person who did not testify at his trial,"
wrote the majority in Shott, "would have an impact upon the administration of their criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration."57
Had the Court not been convinced that pre-Mapp and pre-Griffin
convictions were wholly reliable and that the purposes of Mapp and
Griffin would not be furthered by retroactive application, these two
supplemental considerations by themselves probably would not have
persuaded the Court to deny retroactive effect to Mapp and Griffin.
Jackson v. Denno, 58 for example, overruled retroactively an elevenyear-old Supreme Court decision59 on which the states were presumably entitled to rely. In Jackson the Court held that the widely followed New York rule under which a trial jury determined both the
voluntariness of a confession and the guilt of the accused was unfair
and resulted in unreliable judgments.60 It would seem that the number of post-conviction hearings on the voluntariness issue generated
by Jackson would not be significantly less than the number of new
trials that would have been generated by a retroactive holding in
Mapp. 61 However, Jackson would result in few new trials because in
most instances the post-conviction hearing conducted on the voluntariness of the confession would probably end with a finding that the
confession had been properly admitted. 62
On the other hand, retroactive effect in Mapp or in Griffin would
require new trials whenever illegal evidence had been used or com57. 86 Sup. Ct. at 467. Compare Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 637•38 (quoted
note 27 supra). For a more sanguine view of the probable retroactive consequences of
Mapp, see Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
SUPREME COURT R.Ev. 1, 43 n.204.
58. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
59. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
60. See note 31 supra.
61. It is impossible, of course, to measure the precise impact. At least fifteen states
followed ,the New York procedure. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 406 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). This urged Mr. Justice Black to com•
ment: "The disruptive effect which today's decision will have on the administration
of criminal justice throughout the country will undoubtedly be great." Ibid. In Linh•
letter, the Court stated that over half the states had adopted the exclusionary rule
prior to the imposition of that rule on the states in the Mapp decision. 381 U.S, at 634.
See also Allen, supra note 57, at 43 n.204.
62. In Jackson, the Court expressly declined to grant new trials automatically where
the New York procedure had theretofore governed. Rather, the Court required the
affected states to grant new trials in the unlikely event that the post-conviction hearing
determined that the confession introduced at ,trial was involuntary. Jackson v. Denno,
supra note 61, at 394. The first, fragmentary returns suggest that in most cases the
post-conviction hearing will result in the conclusion that the confession was voluntary.
See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 46 Misc. 2d 742, 262 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (post•
conviction evidentiary hearing for Jackson, as required by the Supreme Court's mandate in Jackson v. Denno); People v. Green, 46 Misc. 2d 812, 260 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup.
Ct.1965).
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ment had been made. The Gideon rule requires new trials, but
Gideon affected far fewer states than either Jackson or Mapp. 63 Although Griffin affected fewer states even than Gideon, Griffin's retroactive impact on those states that had theretofore allowed comment
would have been intense-more intense than the impact of a retroactive holding for Mapp, and certainly more intense than the actual
retroactive effect of Gideon.64 Successful reprosecution would be
most difficult in the Mapp situation because important, possibly critical, evidence would have been rendered inadmissible. 65 Thus a
retroactive holding in Mapp not only would have made available
post-conviction relief to prisoners in many states but also would have
necessitated new trials which, in many instances, the prosecution
could not win without the illegal evidence.
Prior to Linkletter these three elements-widespread impact, a
new trial in each case, and the difficulty of reprosecution-had not
converged in any single retroactivity case. Their convergence in
Linkletter doubtless was a major factor in the Court's decision to
depart from absolute retroactivity and to tailor an exception for
Mapp. It was essentially these elements that reappeared in Shott and
persuaded the Court to tailor a second exception, this time for
Griffin.
Nevertheless, the Court in Linkletter was not required to rely
upon the foregoing factors in creating an exception for Mapp because, in its view, retrospective operation would not have advanced
the fundamental purpose of Mapp and nonretrospective operation
would not operate to foreclose habeas corpus relief to convictions
containing any "likelihood of unreliability or coercion." 66 For reasons previously explored, 67 it seems that after Shott these criteria still
retain their vitality. Hence, they comprise the threshold tests for nonretroactivity. If these tests cannot be met, it would appear that retroactive relief should be granted, even though there was reliance by
63. Before Gideon, thirteen states did not require the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants in serious felony cases. The practice in most of these states, however, was to appoint counsel, at least when the defendant so requested. Kamisar, supra
note 38, at 274-75. See also In re Palmer, 371 Mich. 656, 124 N.W.2d 773 (1963) (Gideon's
impact in Michigan assessed). For a discussion of the impact of Jackson and Mapp upon
the states, see note 61 supra.
64. "It is not in every criminal trial •that tangible evidence of a kind that might
raise Mapp issues is offered. But it may fairly be assumed that there has been comment
in every single trial in the courts of California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New
Mexico, and Ohio, in which the defendant did not take the witness stand-in accordance with state law and with the United States Constitution as explicitly interpreted
by ,this Court for 57 years." 86 Sup. Ct. at 466. The Court's authority, inter alia., for
this proposition was the amicus curiae brief submitted in Shott by the state of California. Ibid. For a discussion of the milder impact of Gideon, see note 63 supra.
65. Reconvictio~ was impossible in the reprosecution of Mapp.
66. 381 U.S. at 638.
67. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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the states upon the prior law and the result will bring an increased
workload for prosecutors and criminal dockets.

III. WHAT Do LINK.LEITER AND SHoTT PORTEND FOR EscoBEno?
Most federal and state courts that have confronted the retroactivity issue in the Escobedo context have held that Escobedo is not
entitled to retroactive effect.68 The basic premise of these decisions is
that the purpose of Escobedo, like Mapp, is to deter illegal police
conduct. At this juncture, two slightly different approaches have
emerged among the courts denying retroactivity to Escobedo. Some
have said that, as in Mapp, a conviction obtained in violation of the
Escobedo rule is nonetheless necessarily trustworthy because the admission of the confession at trial presupposes a finding of voluntariness by the trial judge. 69 The argument is thus made that Linkletter
compels the same result for Escobedo since, as recently expressed by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, "in both Escobedo and
Mapp . . . the reliability of the evidence was not questioned; the
attack was on admissibility of the evidence because it was obtained in
violation of a fundamental constitutional right." 70
Other courts, while indicating that concern for trial reliability
was a reason for the Escobedo rule, have thought it sufficient that
oppressive, pre-Escobedo police procedures "did not necessarily cause
the conviction of the innocent." 71 The conclusion is thus reached
that the role of Escobedo, like that of Mapp, in deterring police misconduct will not be served by retroactive application.
68. These decisions have denied Escobedo retroactive effect: United States ex rel.
Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965); Meyer v. Klinger, 243 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.
Cal. 1965); United States ex rel. Conroy v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ill. 1965); In
re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380 (1965); Ruark v. People, 405
P .2d 751 (Colo. 1965); Bell v. State, 175 So. 2d 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); State ex
rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, - N.W.2d - (Minn. 1965); State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572,
206 A.2d 737, cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 318 (1965); People v. Hovnanian, 22 App. Div. 2d
686, 253 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1964); Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. '1965);
Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965). These decisions have given
Escobedo retroactive effect: United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d
Cir. 1965) (issue not discussed); Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (issue
not discussed); United States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 240 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
(issue not discussed); Cruz v. Delgado, 233 F. Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964) (issue not discussed);
cf. Delaney v. Gladden, 237 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (D. Ore. 1965) (suggestion that Escobedo
necessarily retroactive). It should be emphasized that the decisions applying• Escobedo
retroactively were announced prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Linltletler.
69. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, supra note 68; State v. Johnson,
supra note 68, at 585, 206 A.2d at 744.
70. United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 at 242 (7th Cir, 1965).
71. In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 377, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 195, 398 P.2d 380, 387 (1965),
(Emphasis added.) Compare HALL &: KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 293 (1965):
"Does the absence of counsel at trial necessarily cause the conviction of the innocent?
Does the unavailability of a transcript on appeal necessarily cause the continued in•
carceration of the innocent?" The latter question is a reference to Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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It is not surprising that the courts denying retroactivity to Escobedo have diluted the Linkletter "no likelihood of unreliability"
standard by finding it sufficiently satisfied in the Escobedo situation
where there is a very high probability that the defendant's confession, determined at trial to be voluntary, is trustworthy. In fact, the
Linkletter standard may have been diluted by Shott, where the Supreme Court stated that recent constitutional decisions which have
been retroactively applied dealt with proceedings which presented a
"clear danger of convicting the innocent." 72
It seems doubtful, nonetheless, that the Court intended to establish a "clear danger" test for future use. For example, in Linkletter
and Shott the Court affirmed that Griffin v. Illinois, 13 entitling indigents to free transcripts on automatic appeals in criminal cases, was
properly granted retroactive effect.74 Yet, it might be difficult to
maintain that pre-Griffin v: Illinois convictions carried a much
greater danger of convicting the innocent than pre-Escobedo decisions.75 To consider a second example, it would seem that Massiah v.
United States, 16 which held inadmissible the defendant's post-indictment statements elicited in the absence of retained counsel by the
deliberate subterfuge of federal agents, would be entitled to retroactive effect.77 Such spontaneous admissions undoubtedly carry substantially less risk than jailhouse confessions of convicting the innocent. 78 Finally, White v. Maryland, 79 which is presumably entitled
to retroactive effect,80 reversed a trial conviction in which the prosecution entered into evidence an uncounselled prior plea of guilty
72. 86 Sup. Ct. at 465.
73. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In reaffirming the Griffin principle two years later, the Court
did not discuss the position of two dissenting justices that retrospective operation was
improper. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam) (Harlan
&: Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). For further discussion, see State v. Welch, 214 A.2d 857,
865 (N.J. 1965) (Griffin applied retroactively).
74. 381 U.S. at 639 n,20; 86 Sup. Ct. at 465. See note 31 supra.
75. Unfortunately, there is no way to measure empirically the risk that pre-Griffin
v. Illinois or pre-Escobedo procedures carried for the innocent, indigent defendant.
See note 120 infra.
76. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
77. Since Massiah effectuates "a constitutional principle established as long ago as
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [1932]," 377 U.S. at 205, it seems improbable that the
Court would deny Massiah retroactive implementation.
78. See Enker &: Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 53-58 (1964).
79. 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam).
80. In White, the Court "limited [certiorari] to the point of law raised in Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 [1961]"; the holding in White rests squarely on Hamilton. 373
U.S. at 60. It is noteworthy that Hamilton is a retroactivity case, since, like Gideon,
it rose to the Supreme Court through post-conviction proceedings. Thus, Hamilton
would seem to preclude any argument that White should be given prospective effect
only. See McWilliams v. Gladden, 407 P.2d 833, 840 (Ore. 1965) (Denecke, J., dissenting).
Judge Denecke notes that the majority opinion, without discussion, assumes that
Hamilton and White are entitled to retrospective operation. He does not dispute the
correctness of that position.
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entered by the defendant at his arraignment before he had obtained
the services of counsel. It seems evident that, in contrast to the
uncounselled jailhouse confessions involved in Escobedo situations,
the White plea, entered in open court, presents almost no danger
of leading to a conviction of the innocent.81
Thus, despite the "clear danger" language in the Shott opinion,
the Court, by distinguishing cases affecting "the ascertainment of
truth" at trial, seemed to leave unimpaired the Linkletter "no likelihood of ·unreliability" standard.82 The following discussion will
therefore measure Escobedo against this Linkletter standard.
Those who urge that the Court's primary motive in Escobedo was
to improve the reliability of guilt-determination fail to recognize that
of equal importance was the Court's interest in securing constitutional guarantees for the uninformed citizen.83 But one passage in
Escobedo reveals the Court's disenchantment with the influence of
confessions upon the reliability of guilt-determination:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on
the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. 84
This statement arises, moreover, in a case in which the Court assumed, for the purposes of its opinion, that the confession was trustworthy. 85 It indicates dissatisfaction with the actual operation of the
voluntary-involuntary test, which, at least until Escobedo, had regulated the admissibility of confessions under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 86
81. ~ee Enker &: Elsen, supra note 78, at 50-51.
82. In Shott the Court compared the purposes of Griffin with those of Mapp and
contrasted the purposes of Griffin with those of Gideon, Griffin v. Illinois, Jachson v.
Denno, and Reck v. Pate. See note 25 supra. It would seem unlikely that the Court intended to draw any distinction regarding the degree of unreliability that must be present before retroactivity results. Rather, there is a determined effort in Shott to show
that Griffin, like Mapp, did not involve trial reliability at all.
83. 378 U.S. at 490.
84. Id. at 488-89. (Emphasis added.)
85. In dissent, Mr. Justice White remarked: "Escobedo's statements were not compelled and the Court does not hold that they were." Id. at 498. At first, the Illinois
' Supreme Court reversed Escobedo's conviction by finding the confession involuntary
on the ground that the interrogating officer promised immunity from prosecution and
permission to go home. On rehearing, however, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
Escobedo's conviction, this time taking note of the interrogating officer's denials that
any promises had been made. This history is traced in Kamisar, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OUR TIME 1, 51-52 (Howard ed. 1965).
86. Mr. Justice White, for example, thought that Escobedo marked the end of the
voluntary-involuntary test. 378 U.S. at 496. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Goldberg
never referred explicitly to that test. Since Escobedo, lower courts have not been hesitant in stating that Escobedo was indeed the Supreme Court's response to the unsatisfactory operation of the voluntary-involuntary -test. "T-he resolution of the court in

I
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While the voluntary-involuntary test initially stemmed from ·the
need for a standard to separate tn:stworthy from untrustworthy confessions, it has become in recent years
increasingly a ban against police interrogation methods which
(a) "offended" the court, regardless of whether they posed a
threat to the reliability of the guilt-determining process or (b)
created a substantial risk that a person subjected to them would
£alsely confess, regardless of whether or not this particular defendant did. 81
Most confessions proffered in evidence at trial by the prosecution are
trustworthy, whether voluntary or involuntary. 88 Involuntary confessions are condemned largely because the "defendant [has] . . .
been subjected to pressures to which, under our accusatorial system,
an accused should not be subjected."89 The Court has also drawn
upon the voluntary-involuntary test to exclude confessions when its
probable aim was to ban offensive police interrogation procedures
that did not actually coerce the defendant.a 0 Involuntary confessions
are excluded, therefore, under a "complex of values" 91 of which the
chance of untrustworthiness is just one factor. 92 But the fact that the
Court in Escobedo-where the confession was assumed to be voluntary-rested its reasoning in part on the broad principle that confessions produce a "less reliable" adjucative process indicates the
Court's awareness that in practice the voluntary-involuntary test does
not eliminate all untrustworthy confessions.93 The Escobedo rule
recognizes that in earlier cases with fact-patterns similar to that in
Escobedo to sterilize the police antechamber from the use of coercive tactics undoubtedly
resulted from the realization of the inadequacy of present methods of dealing with
involuntary confessions. The mere rejection of such confessions from evidence has not
prevented police overreaching. Studies have shown that questionable tactics to obtain
confessions or admissions continue on a widespread basis. The very difficulty of detect~
ing the coercion that might occur during police interrogation and the vagueness of
the applicable standards for such determination have been adverse factors necessitating
a new approach." In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 374-75, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 192-93, 398
P.2d 380, 384-85 (1965). For similar expressions, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Walden
v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240, 243 (7th Cir. 1965). See also note 93 infra.
87. Kamisar, supra note 85, at 38-39. See generally Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Omo ST. L.J. 449, 452-53 (1964). Compare
Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary Confession"!-Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's
"Criminal Interrogation and Confessions," 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728, 753-55 (1963).
88. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
89. Ibid. See, e.g., Blackbum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
90. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See Herman, note 87 supra, at 454-57.
91. 381 U.S. at 638, quoting from Blackbum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
92. See Mishkin, supra note 54, at 83-85. See also note 99 infra.
93. As Professor Herman documents, a gulf developed between the result achieved
in theory and in practice under the volm,1tary-involuntary test. Herman, supra note
87, at 456-57. He concludes, "thus the result probably is an uneasy compromise in
which the operation of the rule lags behind theory -and thereby encourages the police
to undertake the sort of interrogation that· theory prohibits." Id. at 458. See also note
86 supra.
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Escobedo there was a possibility that an innocent man could have
been convicted by his untrustworthy confession.94
It is this aspect of Escobedo-that it makes more meaningful the
rules against involuntary confessions-that provides the strongest
argument in favor of granting it retroactive effect. In situations similar to Escobedo, the habeas corpus court cannot determine the voluntariness of the confession introduced at trial. Indeed, if Escobedo
shows dissatisfaction with the voluntary-involuntary test as implemented in the trial court, it would be expecting too much to suppose
that the habeas corpus court can make that determination. For both
the trial and reviewing courts, the principal stumbling-block is the
absence of an independent, objective record of the in camera jailhouse proceedings in which the confession was elicited. To reconstruct what actually happened, therefore, courts must assess against
the denials of the interrogating officers the claims by the accused of
coercion, promises, or other inducements. 05 The difficulty of this
task was a factor responsible for the new approach taken in Escobedo.96
Thus, there is no record upon which the habeas corpus court can
adequately review the admissibility of a confession under the traditional voluntary-involuntary test. If Escobedo is not granted retroac94. See note 86 supra.
95. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 507 (1963). See Douglas, The Means
and the End, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 103, 113-14; Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79
HARv. L. R.Ev. 21, 31 (1965). For discussions of police interrogation methods, sec, e.g.,
!NBAU &: REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962).
96. The Escobedo rule, binding on all courts, thus furthers the ends sought alone in
federal courts under the McNabb-Mallory rule. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The McNabb-Mallory rule's "main
thrust .•• is to bypass conflicts over the nature of the secret interrogation and to
minimize both the 'temptation' and the 'opportunity' to obtain confessions by imper•
missible means." Kamisar, supra note 85, at 39-40. According to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, "Were the police version as to the accused's cooperation
always to be accepted, the law's :restriction on police activity would have little effect.
One purpose of the Mallory doctrine was to eliminate swearing contests between police
and defendant as to what each said and did, by commanding that the defendant be
promptly presented." Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Sec
also Douglas, supra note 95, at 112; Enkcr &: Elsen, supra note 78, at 52. But even in the
District of Columbia, where the McNabb-Mallory rule developed, the arrival of Escobedo
has not (at least until now) brought an end to the police interrogation. "My duty is to
assist effective law enforcement, and protect the rights of suspects. I believe in the
three-hour [confessions] rule and I think the public has a right to threshold state•
ments," the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia recently said. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 20, col. 3 (city ed.). But see Alston v. United States, 848
F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (confession elicited within an hour of arrest held inadmissible).
For Chief Judge Bazclon, at least, any interrogation prior to the assignment of counsel
is probably unlawful. In this area, developments are swift, and a postscript is re•
quired: after this Comment was in type, the United States Attorney for the District
of Columbia reversed himself. All suspects, he has agreed, will be entitled to talk
with a lawyer, free of charge, before they talk to the police. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1966, p. 9, col. 1 (city ed.). Thus, police practice in the District appears to have been
brought into accord with the Alston decision, supra.
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tive effect, therefore, some prisoners, who may be unjustly incarcerated, will have no effective method of substantiating their claims
of innocence. Their predicament is similar to that of post-Betts v.
Brady 91 prisoners. In habeas corpus proceedings, most post-Betts prisoners were caught in a paradox: they were supposed to demonstrate
from the record "special circumstances," although at trial they had
been without the aid of counsel, who alone could develop, in his investigative and legal capacities, a record of special circumstances that
would illustrate the' need for counsel.98 This paradox of Betts also
faces pre-Escobedo prisoners: they cannot develop for a habeas corpus court the inadmissibility of their confessions at trial because their
transcripts will never contain an objective jailhouse record which
would show whether their confessions were secured under circumstances raising severe doubts concerning their reliability. 99
Thus, it may be forcefully argued that the principle applied in
Escobedo goes to the "fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the
fact-finding process,'' 100 and hence falls within the category of cases
distinguished in Linkletter and Shott as deserving of retrospective
treatment. Even assuming that the main purpose of Escobedo is similar to the purpose of Mapp-to deter illegal police conduct-Escobedo is nevertheless different from Mapp in that it cannot be said of
Escobedo that there is "no likelihood of unreliability." 101
In weighing the "merits and demerits" 102 of the retroactivity issue
in its Escobedo context, lower courts analyzing the retroactivity issue
after Linkletter but before Shott have shown an understandable
97. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
98. See note 45 supra.
99. See HALL &: KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 293-94 (1965). For an excellent
treatment of ways in which the Escobedo rule affects ,the reliability of guilt-determination, see Mishkin, note 54 supra, at 95-98. Professor Mishkin feels that the major
problem is not to describe these effects, but rather to weigh their significance. Id. at
99-100. After pointing out that commentators evidently use the term "unreliable
confession" to mean one that is completely false, Professor Herman says that his
brief criminal law practice suggests that the greater danger stems from "partial unreliability." "The interrogee who is guilty of some wrongdoing may, either through
ignorance or in order to end the pressure of the interrogation, accede to a more
serious version of the offense. However, the one or two-line inaccuracy or falsity may
spell the difference between an aggravated and a ,mitigated offense." Herman, supra
note 87, at 454 n.25. This problem was suggested by the recent murder trial of Duane
Pope. The defense, which admitted that Pope committed the murders but contended
that he was not guilty by reason of insanity, .had to overcome a confession signed by
Pope containing a statement of premeditated intent. At trial, Pope repudiated that
admission. According to the New York Times' reporter, "the 22-year-old Kansas farm
youth said he had signed a confession about 'planning' the murders not because it was
true but because the agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation who composed
the statement 'wanted me to' sign it." N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1965, p. 42, col. 4 (city ed.).
See generally Sutherland, supra note 95.
100. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
101. Id. at 638.
102. Id. at 629.
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desire to hold that Linkletter controls Escobedo.103 This resultoriented analysis is indicated by the fact that these courts readily
assume that the purpose of Escobedo is "identical"104 with the purpose of Mapp.
The Supreme Court candidly stated in Escobedo that there
would thereafter be less opportunity for police illegality at the interrogation stage than in the past.105 Yet prevention of police illegality is not the "purpose," in the Linkletter sense, of Escobedo. Escobedo has two dimensions that are broader than the mere deterrence
of police illegality: to make meaningful the rules against involuntary confessions,106 and to make meaningful the presence of counsel
at trial by requiring that counsel be present during the police interrogation. Indeed, an underlying theme of Escobedo is that if counsel
has not been available at the police station, counsel may be of no
utility at trial.101
Apart from inadequate consideration of the element of unreliability inherent in the Escobedo factual pattern, courts denying retroactivity have not inquired whether retroactive effect can logically
be denied for Escobedo when retroactive operation seems to be automatically accorded closely analogous sixth amendment cases. In particular, it seems difficult to justify a nonretroactive result for Escobedo when retroactivity seems assured for cases like White v. Maryland108 and Massiah v. United States. 109 In White, it will be recalled,
the prosecution introduced at trial the defendant's plea of guilty entered, without the benefit of counsel, at the arraignment. The unavailability of counsel at the time of the arraignment was held to
vitiate the subsequent conviction because the arraignment was a
critical stage in the proceeding. The jailhouse interrogation in Escobedo, however, constituted no less critical a stage, as the Escobedo
opinion makes clear.110 Since, as previously discussed,111 the uncoun103. E.g., United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965).
104. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 103.
105. 378 U.S. at 488-90.
106. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
107. "In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, we held ,that every person accused of
a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at trial. The rule sought by
the State here, however, would make the trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and -the 'right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow
thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial
examination.' In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 334 (Black, J. dissenting). 'One can imagine
a cynical prosecutor saying: "Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now. They
can't escape the noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.'' '
Ex Parle Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-18.'' 378 U.S. at 487-88; see Herman, supra
note 87, at 486.
108. 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam). See note 80 supra.
109. 377 U.S. 201 (1964): See note 77 supra.
110. "The fact that many confessions are obtained during this [interrogation] period
points up its critical nature as a 'stage when legal aid and advice' are surely needed,
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selled plea in White and the spontaneous admissions in Massiah carry
virtually no risk of convicting the innocent, it would appear that, in
cases viewed primarily as sixth amendment decisions, retroactive
operation will be granted even though there is almost no element of
unreliability. In these cases, retroactivity seems assured, not because
the presence of counsel would have served to enhance the reliability
of the judgments, but because the presence of counsel would have
furthered another due process goal, one not explicitly articulated:
that convictions be obtained only with deference to the dignity of
the individual. 112 Thus, in light of White and Massiah, it would be
illogical to deny Escobedo retroactive effect.
The foregoing analysis has shown, first, that Escobedo does not
fit into the strict Linkletter standard of "no likelihood of unreliability" and, second, that Escobedo, viewed from its sixth amendment perspective, cannot logically be denied retrospective operation.
Nonetheless, the practical consequences of a retroactive holding for
Escobedo may be momentous enough to persuade the Supreme Court
to broaden further the tests by which a nonretroactive' result can be
reached.
IV.

WOULD RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR ESCOBEDO EMPTY THE PRISONS?

It would be of great value, in any case involving a decision
whether to apply a constitutional rule retroactively, to be able to
measure with a fair degree of accuracy the actual impact of a grant
of retroactivity to the rule. But this is always a speculative venture,
and is particularly so in the Escobedo situation. Even a speculative
assessment of the potential retroactive impact of Escobedo requires
some agreement on Escobedo's scope, and there has been a bitter diviMassiah v. United States, [377 U.S. at 204]; •.• White v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 59] •.••
The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained." 378 U.S. at 488.
111. See text accompanying notes 76 and 79 supra.
112. "Let us suppose the extreme case of a prisoner charged with a capital offense,
who is deaf and dumb, illiterate and feeble minded, unable to employ counsel, with
the whole power of the state arrayed against him, prosecuted by counsel for the state
without assignment of counsel for his defense, tried, convicted and sentenced to death.
Such a result, which, if carried into execution, would be little short of judicial murder,
it cannot be doubted would be a gross violation of the guarantee of due process of law;
and we venture to think that no appellate court, state or federal, would hesitate so to
decide." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 (1932) (Sutherland, J.). Thus, in a ·capital
case it seems offensive to notions of due process for .the state to take a man's life,
however morally guilty he may be, who has been denied the effective assistance of
counsel throughout the accusatory proceedings. See also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (a capital case). See generally Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil
Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13, 28 (1964). If due process notions are offended in a
capital case, they are no less abridged in a noncapital case. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Clark, J. concurring). In. this connection it might be remarked
that the Supreme Court will consider the retroactivity issue in Escobedo in the setting
of a capital case, State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737, cert. granted, 86 Sup. CL
318 (1965).
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sion among courts over this issue. 113 Most federal courts114 and some
state courts115 have construed Escobedo broadly, while most state
courts have construed it narrowly.11 6 Thus, until the Supreme Court
delineates the scope of Escobedo,117 its potential retroactive impact
must be weighed jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, the impact turning in
each state upon the local courts' construction of Escobedo. Clearly,
those states that emphasize the words of limitation that close the
Escobedo opinion118 will have few prisoners eligible for post-conviction relief.
It seems predictable that the Supreme Court will not adopt the
narrowest reading of the Escobedo rule. 119 Accordingly, it would
113. The most publicized is the controversy between the New Jersey Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. After the Third Circuit reversed two
New Jersey murder convictions on Escobedo grounds in May 1965 (see United States
ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965)), Chief Justice Weintraub of
the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered all state judges to disregard the federal ruling
until the United States Supreme Court had acted on the issue. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
1965, p. 32, col. 4 (city ed.). In November 1965 the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965), stating that
the federal decision was not binding on the state courts.
114. E.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, supra note 113. But cf. United
States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965).
115. In this regard, California, more than other states, has moved beyond the words
of limitation that close the Escobedo opinion. Because the California Supreme Court
has closely analyzed many facets of the Escobedo rule, its major decisions on Escobedo's
scope are set forth. People v. Chaney, 63 Cal. 2d 803, 48 Cal. Rptr. 188, 408 P.2d 964
(1965) (Peek, J.); People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 722, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d !165
(1965) (Traynor, C.J.); People v. Marbury, 63 Cal. 2d 601, 47 Cal. Rptr. 491, 407 P.2d
667 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.); People v. Green, 63 Cal. 2d 586, 47 Cal. Rptr. 477, 407 P.2d
653 (1965) (Tobriner, J.); People v. Faris, 63 Cal. 2d 566, 47 Cal. Rptr. 370,407 P.2d 282
(1965) (Traynor, C.J.); People v. Stockman, 63 Cal. 2d 519, 47 Cal. Rptr. 365, 407 P.2d
277 (1965) (Peters, J.); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 542, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265
(1965) (Traynor, C.J.); People v. Price, 63 Cal. 2d 388, 46 Cal. Rptr. 775, 406 P.2d 55
(1965) (Peek, J.); People v. Cotter, 63 Cal. 2d 404, 46 Cal. Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862 (1965)
(Burke, J.); People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97 (1965)
(Tobriner, J.); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 388, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965)
(Tobrincr, J.). California, according to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, represents the
"soft approach" to Escobedo. Neuenfeldt v. State, 138 N.W.2d 252 (Wis. 1965).
116. "If today-we have all but forgotten the confining language in Powell, in recent
months most state courts passing on the matter have only remembered the limiting
facts in Escobedo. Counsel isn't outside the interrogation room trying to get in? Counsel
hasn't instructed the police to cease questioning his client? Escobedo doesn't apply.
The subject hasn't requested counsel? Again, Escobedo doesn't apply-even though
the subject has neither been advised of his right to counsel nor of his right to remain
silent •.•." Kamisar, supra note 85, at 57.
117. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in five "Escobedo" cases: Westover
v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 318 (1965); Johnson v. New Jersey, 86 Sup. Ct. 318 (1965);
Vignera v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 320 (1965); Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 320 (1965);
California v. Stewart, 86 Sup. Ct. 395 (1965).
118. 378 U.S. at 490-92.
119. See generally Kamisar, supra note 85; The Supreme Court, 196:J Term, 78
HARv. L. REv. 143, 217 (1964). It seems improbable, for example, that the Supreme
Court will require a request for counsel before •the Escobedo rule can be invoked. Sec
Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gracefully acquiesced in the Third Circuit's view that no request is
required. See United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
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seem profitable to assum~, when inquiring-speculating-as to the
potential retroactive impact of Escobedo, that the Court will read
Escobedo expansively and will therefore evaluate the retroactivity
problem in that light.
That many state courts have reacted adversely to any extension
of Escobedo is some evidence that a grant of retroactivity would affect
a substantial number of prisoners in most states.120 A _retroactive
holding in Mapp would have been nearly as national in impact; although more than half the states adhered to the exclusionary rule by
the time of the Mapp decision, several were recent converts. 121 It
appears to be widely-perhaps correctly-assumed that in any single
jurisdiction more prisoners would have a claim for post-conviction
relief under a retroactive application of Escobedo than of Mapp. For
example, the California Supreme Court, in rejecting retroactivity for
Escobedo, stated:
[W]e [cannot] overlook the ... consideration that retroactivity
would impose impossible burdens upon the administration of
criminal justice. Unlimited retroactive application of Escobedo
would result in the reconsideration of countless cases that were
correctly decided under the law in force at the time of trial; in
many such cases witnesses and evidence would no longer be
available. Many hardened and dangerous criminals would glean
the greatest profit from unlimited retroactivity; they serve
lengthy sentences imposed long ago; their cases thus offer the
least likelihood of successful retrial. To require a general release
of prisoners of undoubted guilt would be to cripple the orderly
administration of the criminal laws. 122
'
It may be argued, without attempting to disparage the seriousness
of the effect of a retroactive application of Escobedo, that the California court overstated the case, Several factors tend to show that a
retroactive application of Escobedo would not result in a "general
release" of prisoners. First, a retroactive result would not affect prisoners who entered pleas of guilty upon the advice of counsel, because entering the plea constitutes a waiver of all defenses, including
120. See note 116 supra. "It must be concluded tbat we have no way of knowing
how many uncounseled defendants may have been convicted on unreliable confessions
unless we accord restrospective application to Escobedo." Commonwealth v. Negri,
213 A.2d 670, 679 (Pa. 1965) (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961).
122. In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 381, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198, 398 P .2d 380, 390 (1965).
(Emphasis added.) In Lopez, tbe California court may be proceeding on the assumption
tbat sentences tend to be longer-perhaps much longer-in convictions based on confessions tban, for example, on illegally seized evidence. See Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUPREME COURT REv. 1, 43 n.204.
Hence, in tbe Escobedo situation more prisoners would seek post-conviction relief. Previously, California had reasoned tbat Escobedo could not be strictly confined to its
facts. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42· Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P_.2d 861 (1965). See note
115 supra.
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constitutional defenses.123 Thus these prisoners would be precluded
from raising an Escobedo objection, even though in many instances
the plea would have been induced by the knowledge that the prosecutor possessed a confession now conceded to be violative of a broad
Escobedo rule. Since a high percentage of all cases are settled by plea,
Escobedo's retroactive impact would be correspondingly diminished.124 Second, it appears improbable that a retroactive application
of Escobedo would result in the wholesale release of hardened criminals. Many would have refused to confess,125 and those who did
might well be held by habeas corpus courts to have been aware of,
and to have waived, their right to counsel. Third, Justice Sobel's
recent survey, although limited to one coun,ty, supports the view that
confessions are rarely involved. in trial convictions.126 Fourth, al123. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). See also Note, 112 U.
PA. L. R.Ev. 865, 871, 888 (1964). Compare Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Peroasive Right" of an Accused,
30 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 29-31 (1962). Admitting that the present state of authority is
against him but hopeful that courts might be persuaded to change their positions,
Professor Kamisar makes an argument based on the "poisonous tree" doctrine: "After
all, a 'voluntary' plea preceded by a coerced confession is not necessarily a reliable
plea. If the defendant is under the misapprehension that the prior confession is ad•
missible against him, he may adhere to it even though he knows it is false, since he
believes he 'can't win' anyhow and that he might well receive a lighter sentence by
not putting the state to the trouble of a trial." Id. at 30.
124. See Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865-66 (1964). Justice Roberts, analyzing the potential retroactive effect of Escobedo in Pennsylvania, stated that the number of retrials
would not be very great because nearly three fourths of all convictions were based on
pleas of guilty. Under Pennsylvania decisions, he pointed out, post-conviction attack on
Escobedo grounds was precluded unless counsel at trial had raised a right-to-counsel
objection against the admission of the confession. The chance that this particular objec•
tion was made in any given case, he believed, would be very slight. But even if it were
made, he continued, there remained the possibility that the police did in fact warn the
accused of his constitutional right to counsel. "It seems to me ••• fears that wholes:He
disruption of convictions will attend the Escobedo rule, expressed with frequency in
recent times, are grossly exaggerated." Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 680
(Pa. 1965) (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting). Moreover, "it is logical to assume ... -that confessions usually result in pleas rather than trials." Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions[:] A Legal Perspective-A Practical Perspective (p. IV), 154 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 22, 1965, p. 4.
125. Almost by definition, "hardened" criminals do not yield during a police in•
terrogation. "Defendants who confess are the derelicts of society. Anyone with the
intelligence to organize a racket presumably would have the intelligence not to confess,"
Sobel, supra note 124, at 4. But cf. CAPOTE, IN CoLD BLOOD 217, 230, 233 (1965). The
confessions obtained by detectives from Hickock and Smith, "hardened criminals,"
were used against them to great advantage. Id. at 285-86. In connection with the effect
of Escobedo upon present police interrogation, the chief trial lawyer of the Philadelphia
District Attorney's office has said: "I hate to admit it, but on the basis of our early
reports we haven't lost a single confession, except to racket men and hardened criminals who never ·talk anyway." N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 70, col. 6. For the effect
of Escobedo in the District of Columbia, see note 46 supra.
126. "Experienced judges have known for a long time that confession issues arc
involved in only a small percentage of cases. They have observed ·how infrequently
'confessions' are involved in plea discussions. They have observed how very infrequently
they are required to charge confession doctrines at trials." Sobel; supra note 124, at 4.
Justice Sobel studied the first one thousand indictments returned in Kings County,
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though Escobedo's retroactive effect would be wider than would
have been that of Griffin v. California, Escobedo's would not be as
pervasive in any one jurisdiction. 127 Fifth, at the post-conviction
stage, many prisoners would be deterred in some states from seeking
habeas corpus relief under a retroactive application of Escobedo for
fear of reconviction with its attendant risk of a longer sentence.128
New York, after January 7, 1965. This was a very limited sampling, as he stressed. But
the evidence nonetheless supported the finding that confessions were not as essential
to convictions as police spokesmen and prosecutors often have claimed: "[Most] serious
crimes are cleared by ,the factor-astonishing to ,the uninformed-that in nearly all
assaults; in 35 per cent of robberies and in 45 per cent of forcible rapes, the protagonists
-the victim and the perpetrator-were known to one another prior to the commission
of ,the crime. Even where not known to one another, in a large percentage of these
cases there is positive identification. Thus, neither interrogation- or even investigation
is essential." Id. at 5. In homicides, Justice Sobel stated that confessions were not
normally essential because "80 per cent of · all murders are committed within the
family or among and between 'friends' and therefore, the 'killer' is usually known if
indeed he does not tum •himself in." Ibid. During the period surveyed; "nine murder
indictments were filed. In not a single instance was a 'confession' involved.'' Id. at 4.
The survey does not take into account, however, the extent to which confessions,
though not offered in evidence, provide leads which result in the discovery of physical
evidence or witnesses. See Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind?
-The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality, and the Administration of
Criminal Justice (pt. II), 155 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 24, 1966, p. 4. In rebuttal to Justice Sobel;
New York District Attorney Frank Hogan disclosed that in 91 homicide cases pending in
New York County, confessions would be offered in 62 (68%) and stated that in 25 cases
(27%) indictments could not have been returned without a confession. Even this
estimate was thought -to be "considerably below those usually made by prosecutors
and police officials.'' N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 52, col. I. See generally Bickel, After
the Arrest, The New Republic, Feb. 12, 1966, p. 14. In Detroit, Vincent W. Piersante,
Chief of Detectives, has said the importance of confessions "varies greatly, depending
upon the crime involved.'' For example, the Chief maintained that the police were
"heavily dependent on confessions in burglary investigations" [the number of confess
sions obtained in such investigations had dropped from 64.5% in 1961 to 32.4% in
1965; confessions were deemed "essential" in 24.3% of the 1965 cases as opposed to
53.2% in 1961] whereas recent confession-right-to-counsel cases had had "very little
impact" on murder investigations, probably because his department's "pre-arrest investigatory procedures were especially effective and thorough with respect to this crime.''
Kamisar, supra, at 4 n.29.
127. Compare note 126 supra 'with note 64 supra. Griffin's retroactive impact depends, of course, on how it would have been applied retroactively. It seems to have
been assumed that retroactivity would have been granted in all situations. However,
its retroactive effect might have been reduced by requiring a showing of prejudice.
Thus, those who -the record indicated vigorously forwarded their claims of innocence
before the jury might •have been precluded from arguing that they were coerced into
taking the stand through fear of the influence upon the jury of prosecution comment.
128. E.g., Stat~ v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964). In the first trial,
the defendant received a two-year sentence. He invoked Gideon to invalidate his
initial conviction. Upon retrial, he was again convicted but was given a ten-year sentence, without credit for the six months he had served under the first .conviction. See
generally Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). "[H]arsher sentences following reconviction
of successful appellants are permissible throughout the federal s;ourts and in-the vast
majopty of the states.''".Id. at 610. The author details the legal arguments which should
ultimately terminate this practice•. California, New Jersey, and the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit appear to be moving toward abandoqment of the prac~ce.
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P..2d 677 (1963); State v.
Wolf, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2423 (Gen. Feb. 15, 1966); United States ex rel. Hetenyi v.
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Finally. in many cases where retrials are ordered, the prosecution is
able to obtain reconvictions based on evidence other than the confession introduced at the initial trial.1 29 A retroactive application of
Escobedo is thus less likely to impede a successful retrial than would
have been the case under a retroactive holding in Mapp. 130
V.

CONCLUSION

Unless directed otherwise by the United States Supreme Court,
most lower courts will not grant retroactive effect to Escobedo, as the
post-Linkletter decisions convincingly illustrate.131 Indeed, the Linhletter and Shott decisions provide easy avenues by which courts can
avoid full analysis of the retroactivity issue in Escobedo. In any event,
the Supreme Court will soon resolve the Escobedo retroactivity
issue. 132
It is, of course, conceivable that the Court will react to the retroactivity problem in Escobedo by ignoring those aspects of the Escobedo opinion indicating that Escobedo affects trial reliability.133 This
was the approach adopted in Shott, where the Court passed over the
Griffin Court's analysis of the impact of the comment rule upon guilt
determination by undertaking a discussion of "other values" underlying the privilege against self-incrimination, values that barely re•
ceived attention in Gritfin.134 In the Escobedo context, it will be
more. difficult for the Court to turn to "other values" (principally
those behind the privilege against self-incrimination) because Escobedo seems partially aimed at strengthening the rules against involuntary confessions.185 If the Court was concerned in Escobedo
with the risk of unreliability of confessions, the presentation of the
retroactivity issue in Escobedo provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify its rationale and should require the Court to deterWilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (1965). Competing policies are suggested in HALL &: KAMISAR,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 294-95, 490 (1965).
129. In many cases, the confession is "the icing on the cake." See, e.g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963). In 1962, Professor Ritz surveyed the subsequent
history of state convictions, resting on allegedly involuntary confessions, actually re•
viewed by the Supreme Court. At that time the Court had considered thirty-five cases,
reversing in twenty-two instances. "The defendants in exactly half of the [twenty-two)
cases were again convicted of the same or a lesser included offense, while the defendants
in the other half were eventually released in one way or another." Ritz, State Criminal
Confession Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court
and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. &: LEE L. R.Ev. 202, 208 (1962), See also Sobel,
supra note 124, at 5. Most confessions, Justice Sobel reports, are given by suspects who
are already "hooked."
130. Compare note 129 supra with text following note 64 supra.
131. See note 68 supra.
.
132. The retroactivity issue in Escobedo is presented to the Court in Johnson v.
New Jersey, 43 N.J. 572, 200 A.2d 737, cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 318 (1965).
133. See text accompanying notes 84 and 93 supra.
134. See text following note 48 supra.
135. See text at note 93_ supra.
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mine whether retroactivity can be denied when trial reliability is to
some extent at issue.
Thus, should Escobedo be held nonretroactive, the Court will
have moved beyond the reasoning of Linkletter and Shott. 136 Inevitably, three Supreme Court decisions denying retroactivity, announced in quick succession, will spark lower courts to deny retroactive effect in other contexts.137 Such a development would represent
a substantial departure from the twin traditions of the retroactive
nature of judicial decision-making and individualized justice in accordance with current constitutional norms. Escobedo gives the
Court not only an opportunity to reinvigorate those traditions, but
also a forum to make the unequivocal promise that convictions based
in some degree on unreliable judgments, however slight the chance
of unreliability in any single instance, will always be open t~ habeas
corpus review.
J. Alan Galbraith
136. Possibly, the Court will be influenced in its disposition of the Escobedo
retroactivity issue by the thought that denial of retroactive effect might leave the Court
more freedom to broaden •the Escobedo holding. See text at notes 11-12 supra.
1.37. For example, it must soon be decided whether retrospective operation will be
granted to Pointer v. Texas, .380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment's guarantee of a
defendant's right "to be confronted with the witness against him" held binding on
state courts).

